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Abstract. This article analyzes the language of recent United States Government communications related 
to the intent to assassinate Osama bin Laden, an alleged mastermind of terrorism operations. 
 
From open-source information, one can learn that the plotting or carrying out of assassination by 
anyone employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government (USG) has been forbidden by 
the USG since an executive order Issued by President Ford in the 1975-1976 timeframe. Yet journalistic 
accounts of USG discourse concerning recent USG military attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan suggest that 
"forbidden" can be subverted in creative and intriguing ways. 
 
USG discourse suggests that it may be acceptable to intentionally target--by any means necessary--
terrorist "infrastructures." The term "infrastructures" usually denotes nonliving assets such as 
communications, transportation, logistics, and weapons. Ye t people develop, maintain, upgrade, and/or 
protect infrastructures and may be proximal to infrastructural assets when the latter are attacked--
inadvertently, unavoidably, or in a premeditated fashion. Moreover, people may be considered 
infrastructure in at least two ways: first, if the infrastructural function--e.g., communication--is 
constituted by human resources--e.g., face-to-face, word-of-mouth communication; second--as 
described above--because human assets are necessary to develop, maintain, upgrade, and/or protect 
what are usually denoted as infrastructures. So there at least three different rationales for achieving the 
proximal goal of an assassination policy--the deaths of human targets--by seeming to comply with it. 
These rationales stemming from "by any means necessary" resonate with the applied philosophical 
premises of Malcolm X. 
 
USG discourse also suggests that it may be acceptable to attack people commanding a terrorist 
organization but not to intentionally plan to kill individual people. In essence, there are two semantic 
routes to arrive at the proximal goal of an assassination policy. The first is to plan to "attack" as opposed 
to "kill." The second is to target a group of people as opposed to one person. 
 
Moreover, USG discourse suggests that it may be acceptable to intentionally plan to kill and to kill one 
or more people if the context is that of a war. Here it is interesting to note that the common political 
boilerplate of exhorting that terrorists are at war with the US and that the US is in a war with terrorists 
has at least three typical consequences: first, the authorization and allocation of more money for 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities; second, a nexus of the marshalling of politic al support 
and the demonstration of political will against terrorism; third, the pretext for intentionally killing 
people who are now viable military targets of war. 
 
In addition, USG discourse suggests that it may be acceptable to intentionally plan to kill and to kill 
people who are both proximally and distally engaged in an "ongoing effort" against U.S. interests. The 
rationale here is one of "self-defense" against the "ongoing effort"--thus the USG need not to wait for 
the planning and initiation of a specific terrorist attack before attempting to kill people. The net cast can 
be wide indeed--so wide that one might contemplate whether the subverters of U.S . currency, values, 
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and the quest for Olympic medals might be included during an interlude of mass and/or executive 
hysteria. 
 
Finally, USG discourse suggests that it apparently is acceptable to target an individual or individuals for 
death via something called a Presidential finding. The finding usually functions as an exception to the 
usual way of carrying out political business and is vetted by some combination of Presidential political 
aides, Congressional representatives, and varying legal authorities. In other words, assassination 
remains forbidden except when it's not. 
 
The current USG proscription against assassination serve a dual purpose. It can be used as propaganda 
(propagating the faith) to reinforce an image of the USG as supporting the sanctity of life and human 
rights. It also can be used as a cover for decisions to engage in assassination or to effect its 
consequences. An analysis of the USG language to proscribe and--in special cases to prescribe--
assassination suggests that the intent and the rule of law may too easily be assassinated as well. In this 
sense, the goals of anti-US terrorists are fulfilled, as assassination policy and the national security 
interests of the USG are subverted. (See Feldman, H. (1954). The hero as assassin, Psychoanalysis, 3, 48-
64; Martin, J. (1984-1985). Clinical contributions to the theory of the fictive personality. Annual of 
Psychoanalysis, 12-13, 267-300; Pontius, A.A. (1974). Threats to assassinate the king-president while 
propitiating mother: Some aspects of dangerousness. Journal of Analytic al Psychology, 19, 38-53; Risen, 
J. (November 14, 1998). Bin Laden was target of air strikes, U.S. acknowledges. The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com; Rothstein, D.A. (1973). Reflections on a contagion of assassination. Life-
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